Background

According to Hendin ('Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the 20th Century - A Century of Evolution') Field Marshal Keitel (as Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces) issued this order in September 1941 (the order was received directly from Adolf Hitler) to his subordinate Field Marshall List (Commander in Chief, 12th Army and Armed Forces Commander, Southeast) to quell insurgent forces in the German occupied territories:



The US Tribunal found that a commander of an occupied territory was accountable for the conduct of all of the units under his command. This command included both military command authority the necessary executive authority over the occupied territory. Under Council Control Order No. 10 it was determined that as a fundamental principle, the territorial commander was accountable for the crimes of his subordinates and for the prevention of war crimes within his command. It also found that a plea of 'no knowledge' was inadmissible, as was a lack of knowledge of information supplied to the commander's headquarters.'

The Allegations Against Keitel

Field Marshal Keitel, as Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces was bought before the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on 19th October, 1945. When he was handed his indictment he believed that it was a foregone conclusion that he would be found guilty. He did however plead 'not guilty' to the allegations. His defence counsel was Dr. Otto Nelte, a former industrial lawyer from Siegburg, Germany. In Keitel's defence, Dr. Nelte did not ask for his acquittal. Rather, he pleaded: '...only for his client's tragic dilemma to be recognised and understood.' Nelte submitted that Keitel: '...was fighting to save not his neck but his face' and that his: 'obedience and loyalty had been his only guiding principles.'

This background is precised from 'The Nixkor Project' (available at: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/) which is fully acknowledged.

Keitel was Chief of Staff to the Minister of War (Von Blomberg) from 1935 to 4th February, 1938. On that day Hitler took command of all the Armed Forces with Keitel becoming Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, although Keitel did not have command authority over the three Wehrmacht branches which enjoyed direct access to the Supreme Commander.

The charge against Keitel of 'Crimes against Peace' alleged that Keitel attended the Schuschnigg conference in February, 1938 with two other generals. Hitler and Keitel pressured Austria with false rumors, broadcasts, and troop maneuvers. When Schuschnigg called his plebiscite Keitel briefed Hitler and Hitler issued 'Case Otto' which Keitel initialed.

In late April, 1938 Hitler and Keitel conspired to provoke an attack on Czechoslovakia. Keitel signed many directives and memoranda on 'Fall Gruen' including the directive of 30th May (containing Hitler's statement):'It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.'

Keitel initialed Hitler's directive for the attack on Czechoslovakia and he issued two supplements. The second supplement stated:

On 23rd May, 1939 when Hitler announced his decision: 'to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity' Keitel was present. The invasion of Norway and Denmark was discussed by Keitel with Hitler, Jodl, and Raeder. He issued a further directive on 1st December, 1940 which he kept under his direct and personal guidance. On 23rd May, 1939 Hitler announced that he would ignore the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands and Keitel signed orders for these attacks.

Planning for the attacks on Greece and Yugoslavia occured in November, 1940. On 18th March, 1941 Keitel overheard Hitler tell Raeder that a complete occupation of Greece was a prerequisite to settlement. He also heard Hitler make a decree on 27th March that the destruction of Yugoslavia should take place with 'unmerciful harshness.'

Keitel testified that he opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union for military reasons (as it would constitute a violation of the Non-aggression Pact). He did however 'Case Barbarossa' signed by Hitler on 18th December, 1940 and he attended a further discussion with Hitler on 3rd February, 1941. Keitel's supplement of 13th March established the relationship between the military and political officers. He issued his timetable for the invasion on 6th June, 1941 and was present at the briefing of 14th June when the generals gave their final reports before attack. He appointed Jodl and Warlimont as representatives to Rosenberg on matters concerning the Eastern Territories. On 16th June he directed all army units to carry out the economic directives issued by Goering in the so-called 'Green Folder' for the exploitation of Russian territory, food, and raw materials.

The following is a rather lengthy extract of the US Tribunal's case against Field Marshall Keitel in which the accused gave evidence on the 4th April, 1946 (Day 99) in respect to his alleged activities in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Low Countries, Greece and Yugoslavia, USSR, treatment of PW, Hostages and reprisals. This extract of Day 99 of the trial which relates to the issues of 'Superior Orders' has been extracted from the British Attorney-General's Stationery Office (London, 1946). Although lengthy, it is an historical snapshot of one days session of the US Tribunal and the depth of questioning that did occur.

Dr. Otto Nelte was Keitel's appointed Defence Counsel.

Day 99 - Field Marshall Keitel is Examined by his Defence Counsel Dr. Nelte

Dr. Nelte Leading - Q. Yesterday we discussed last the meeting on 21st April between you, Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I am again having Document 388-PS brought to you and ask you to answer the following question: Was this not a conference of the kind which you said yesterday in principle did not take place?

A. To a certain extent it is true that I was called in and, to my complete surprise, heard suggestions about preparations for war against Czechoslovakia. This happened in a very short interview, before one of Hitler's departures for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall saying anything beyond asking one question, and then, after being told of these surprising suggestions, I went home.

Q. What happened then, so far as you were concerned?

A. My reflections during the first hour after that conference were that this operation could not be carried out by the Army in view of the military strength which I knew to be ours at that time. I then comforted myself with the thought that nothing could be planned for the immediate future. The following day I discussed the matter with the Chief of the Operations Staff, General Jodl. I never received any minutes of this discussion, nor any record. The outcome of our deliberations was "to leave things alone because there was plenty of time, and because any such action was, for military reasons, out of the question at that moment. I also explained to Jodl that the introductory words had been: "It is not my intention to undertake aggressive action against Czechoslovakia in the near future." Then, in the following weeks, we started theoretical and careful deliberations; but without consulting the various branches of the Armed Forces, because we did not consider that we had the authority to do so. In the following months, as can be seen from the Schmundt file, the army adjutants continuously asked innumerable detailed questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on. These questions were answered by the Armed Forces Operations Staff to the best of their knowledge.

Q. I believe we can shorten this considerably, Marshal, however important your explanations are. The decisive point now is - please take the document in front of you and compare the draft which you finally made on orders from Obersalzberg, and tell me what happened after that.
A. Yes. About four weeks after I had been given this job, I sent to Obersalzberg a draft of a directive for the preparatory measures. In reply I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin to speak with the Commander-in- Chief. He came to Berlin at the end of May, and I was present at the conference with General von Brauchitsch. In this conference the basic plan was changed altogether, for Hitler expressed the intention to take military action against Czechoslovakia in the very near future. The reason why he changed his mind was because Czecho-slovakia - I believe on 20th or 21st May - had ordered general mobilisation, and Hitler at that time declared this could only have been directed against us. Military preparations had not been made by Germany. This was the reason for the complete change of his intentions, which he communicated orally to the Commander-in- Chief of the Army; and he ordered him to begin preparations at once. This explains the changes in the directive which was then issued, in which the basic idea is expressed in the words: "It is my irrevocable decision to take military action against Czechoslovakia in the near future."

Q. War against Czechoslovakia was avoided as a result of the Munich Agreement. What did you and the other generals think of this agreement?

A. We were extremely glad that it had not come to a military operation, because throughout the time of preparation we had always been of the opinion that our means of attack against the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were inadequate. From a purely military point of view we were not strong enough to stage an attack which would involve the piercing of the frontier fortifications; we lacked material for such an attack. Consequently we were extremely glad that a peaceful political solution had been reached.

Q. What effect did this agreement have on the generals, regarding Hitler's prestige?

A. I believe I may say that it greatly increased Hitler's prestige with them. We recognised that, on the one hand, military means and military preparations had not been neglected and that on the other hand a solution had been found which we had not expected and for which we were extremely thankful.

Q. Is it not amazing that three weeks after the Munich Agreement which had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler should have given instructions for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia?

A. I believe that recently Marshal Goering enlarged on this question in the course of his examination. My impression, as I remember it, is that Hitler told me at that time that he did not believe that Czechoslovakia would be able to overcome the loss of the Sudeten-German territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was concerned about the close relations then existing between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and thought that Czechoslovakia could and perhaps would become a military and strategic menace. These were the military reasons which were given to me.

Q. Did no one point out to Hitler the great danger of solving the problem of the remainder of Czechoslovakia by force of arms - the danger that other powers, that is England and France, would be antagonised?

A. I was not informed of the last conversation in Munich between the British Prime Minister Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. However, I regarded this question, as far as its further treatment was concerned, as a political one, and consequently I did not raise any objections, if I may so express myself, especially as the military preparations decided on before the Munich meeting were considerably cut down. Whenever the political question was raised, the Fuehrer refused to discuss it.

Q. In connection with this question of Czechoslovakia, I should like to mention Lt.-Colonel Koechling, who was described by the prosecution as the liaison man with Henlein. Was the Wehrmacht or the O.K.W. engaged in this matter?

A. Koechling's job remained unknown to me, though it was I who nominated him. Hitler asked me if an officer was available for a special mission, and if so he should report to me. After I dispatched Lt.-Colonel Koechling from Berlin I neither saw nor spoke to him again. I do know, however, that, as I heard later, he was with Henlein as military adviser.

Q. The prosecution has pointed out that you were present at the visit of Minister President Tiso in March, 1939, as well as at the visit of President Hacha, and from this it was deduced that you took part in the political discussions which then took place. What role did you play on these occasions?

A. It is true that on the occasion of such visits of foreign statesmen I was nearly always present in the Reich Chancellery or at the reception, but I never took part in the actual discussions of political questions. I was present at the reception and considered that I should take part in the discussions, in my position as high ranking representative of the Wehrmacht. But in every case that I can recall I was dismissed with thanks and waited in the ante-chamber in case I should be needed. I can positively say that I did not speak a word to either Tiso or President Hacha on that night nor did I take part in Hitler's direct discussions with these men. May I add that on the night of President Hacha's visit I had to be present in the Reich Chancellery, because during that night the High Command of the Army had to be instructed as to how the entry into Czechoslovakia which had been prepared was to be carried out. Q. In this connection I wish to confirm just one point, since I assume this has already been made clear by Reich Marshal Goering's testimony. You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombing of Prague, should he not see fit to sign?

A. No.

Q. We come now to the case of Poland. The prosecution accuses you of having participated in the planning and preparation for military action against this country too, and of having assisted in carrying it out. Would you state in brief your basic attitude towards these Eastern problems?

A. The question concerning the problem of Danzig and the Corridor were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and negotiations with regard to these questions were pending. The case for the attack on Poland, which in the course of time had to be and was prepared, was, of course, closely connected with these problems. I was not concerned with political matters, but was of the opinion that military preparations, that is, military pressure, if I may call it such, would play the same kind of role as, in my opinion, it had played at Munich. I did not believe that the matter would be brought to an end without such preparations.

Q. Could not this question have been solved by direct negotiations?

A. That is hard for me to say, although I know that several discussions took place about the Danzig question as well as about a solution of the Corridor problem. I recall a remark of Hitler's that impressed me at the time, when he said that he deplored Marshal Pilsudski's death, because he believed he had reached or could have reached an agreement with this statesman. Hitler made this statement in my presence.

Q. The prosecution had stated that as early as the autumn of 1938, Hitler was busy with the question of a war against Poland. Did you take any part in this?

A. No. This I cannot recall. I am inclined to believe that there were, even then, signs that this was not the case. At that time I accompanied Hitler on an extensive tour of inspection of the Eastern fortifications. We covered the entire front from Pomerania through the Oder-Warthe Marshland as far as Breslau in order to inspect the individual frontier fortifications against Poland. The question of fortifications in East Prussia was thoroughly discussed at that time. When I consider these discussions today, I can only assume that they were possibly connected with the Danzig and Corridor problem, and that Hitler simply wanted to find out whether these Eastern fortifications had sufficient defensive strength should that problem eventually lead to war with Poland.

Q. When were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig?

A. I believe that as early as the late autumn of 1938 orders were issued that Danzig be occupied at a favourable moment by a surprise attack from East Prussia. That is all I know about it.

Q. Was the possibility of war against Poland discussed in this connection?

A. Yes, and it was apparently in this connection that the possibilities of frontier defences were examined, but I do not recall any kind of preparation, of military preparation, at that time, indeed there was none, Apart from that against a surprise attack from East Prussia.

Q. If I remember rightly you once told me, when we discussed this question, that Danzig was to be occupied only if this would not lead to a war with Poland.

A. Yes, that is so. This statement was made time and again, that this occupation of, or the surprise attack on Danzig was only to be carried out if it was certain that it would not lead to war.

Q. When did this view change?

A. I believe Poland's refusal to discuss any kind of solution of the Danzig question was apparently the reason for further deliberations and steps.

Q. The prosecution -

A. I might perhaps add that, generally speaking, after Munich the situation in regard to the Eastern problem too was viewed differently, possibly or, as I think, probably, from this point of view. The problem of Czechoslovakia had been solved satisfactorily without a shot. This would perhaps also be possible with regard to the other German problems in the East. I also believe I remember Hitler saying that he did not think the Western Powers, particularly England, would be interested in Germany's Eastern problem, and would rather act as mediators than raise any objections.

Q. Now this is Document C-102, the "Case Weiss." According to this, a directive was issued on 3rd April, 1939.

A. As to this document: it begins by stating that this directive was intended to replace the regular annual instructions of the Armed Forces regarding possible preparations for mobilisation - that it was a further elaboration of details known to us from the instructions which had been issued in 1937-8 and which were issued every year. In fact, however, at or shortly before that time Hitler had, in my presence, directly instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to make strategic and operative preparations for an attack and war on Poland. I then issued this directive, as can be seen from the document. It states that the Fuehrer had already ordered the following: that everything should be worked out by the O.K.H. of the Army by 1st September, 1939, and that, after this, a time table should be drawn up. This directive was signed by me at that time.

Q. What was your attitude and that of the other generals towards this war?

A. I must say that at this time, as in the case of the preparations against Czechoslovakia, both the High Command of the Army and the generals to whom I spoke, and I, too, were opposed to the idea of waging a war against Poland. We did not want this war, but, of course, we immediately began to carry out the orders given, at least as far as the elaboration by the General Staff was concerned. Our justification was that the military means which to our knowledge were at our disposal, that is to say, the divisions, their equipment, their armament, and their absolutely inadequate supply of munitions kept reminding us as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war.

Q. Do you mean to say that, in your deliberations, it was only the military viewpoint that influenced your attitude?

A. Yes. I must admit that. I did not concern myself with the political problems but only with the question: Can we or can we not?

Q. Now, on 23rd May, 1939, there was a conference at which Hitler addressed the generals. You know this address? What was the reason for it and what did it contain?

A. I saw the notes on it for the first time in the course of my interrogations here. It reminded me of the situation at that time. The purpose of this address was to show the generals that what was being done was justified; to remove their misgivings; and finally to point out that the last word was not yet spoken, and that political negotiations about these matters still could and perhaps would change the situation. The address was, in fact, intended simply to give encouragement.

Q. Were you at that time of the opinion that war would actually break out?

A. No, at that time I believed that war would not break out, that in view of the military preparations ordered, negotiations would take place again and a solution be found. Our considerations were always dominated by a military viewpoint. We generals believed that France - and, to a lesser extent, England, in view of her mutual assistance pact with Poland - would intervene and that in general we did not have the defensive means to cope with such an event. For this very reason I personally was always convinced that there would be no war because we could not wage a war against Poland if France attacked us in the West.

Q. Now, what was your opinion of the situation after the speech of 22nd August, 1939?

A. This speech, made at the end of August, was addressed to the generals assembled at Obersalzberg, the Commanders-in- Chief of the troops in the East. When Hitler, towards the end of this speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with the Soviet Union, I was firmly convinced that there would be no war, because I believed that these conditions constituted a basis for negotiation and that Poland would not be recalcitrant. I also believed that now a basis for negotiations had been found although Hitler said in this speech, a copy of which I read here for the first time from notes, that all preparations had been made, and that it was intended to put them into execution.

Q. Did you know that England actually attempted to act as intermediary?

A. No, I knew nothing of these matters. A thing which was very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been discussed here repeatedly, namely on 24th or 25th August, only a few days after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery and his only words were "Stop everything at once, fetch Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations." I believe that after these few words I was dismissed.

Q. What followed?

A. I at once rang up the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch, and passed on the order, and he was called to the Fuehrer. Everything was stopped and all decisions on possible military action were suspended, first without any time limit, but on the following day for a certain limited period. I think, from what we can calculate today, the period was five days.

Q. Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland?

A. I believe that I read them in the Reich Chancellery, that Hitler himself showed them to me and that I received a copy.

Q. As you saw them, I would like to ask whether you considered these demands to be serious?

A. At that time I was never in the Reich Chancellery for more than a few minutes, and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were perfectly serious demands.

Q. Was there any talk at that time of border incidents?

A. No. This question of border incidents was, too, extensively discussed with me here in my interrogations, but in the few discussions we had at the Reich Chancellery in those days there was no discussion at all of this question.

Q. I now show you Document 795-PS, which consists of notes dealing with the Polish uniforms for Heydrich.

A. May I add ...

Q. Please do.

A. ... namely, that on 30th August, the day for the attack was again postponed for twenty-four hours. For this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reich Chancellery and to my recollection the reason given was that a Polish plenipotentiary was expected. Everything was to be postponed for twenty-four hours. Then there were further changes in the military instructions.

This document deals with Polish uniforms for border incidents or for some sort of illegal actions. It has been shown to me. It concerns subsequent notes made by Canaris of a conversation he had with me. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish uniforms. This order had been communicated to him by the Fuehrer through an adjutant. I asked: "For what purpose?" We both agreed that this was intended for some illegal action. If I remember rightly I told him at that time that I did not expect much from it and that he had better have nothing to do with it. We then had a short discussion about Dirschau, which was also to be taken by a surprise attack by the Wehrmacht. That is all I heard of it. I believe I told Canaris he could dodge the issue by saying that he had no Polish uniforms - he could simply say he had none - and the matter would be settled.

Q. You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything of this incident?

A. This incident, this action has for the first time come to my knowledge here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the statements made here before this Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred.

Q. Did you know of America's and Italy's efforts after 1st September, 1939, to end the war in one way or another?

A. I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took place in those days from 24th August to the end of that month or the beginning of September. I never knew anything about the visit of one Mr. Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London's intervention. I only remember that, whilst in the Reich Chancellery for a short while, I met Hitler and he said, "Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier." This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the matters I heard of here and of the further steps that were taken after 1st September. Nothing at all.

Q. What did you say in the Fuehrer's train to Canaris and Lahousen on 14th September, that is shortly before the attack on Warsaw, with regard to the so-termed political "Flurbereinigung" (House cleaning)?

A. I have been interrogated here about this point, but I could not recall this visit at all. However, it appeared, from Lahousen's testimony, that I had repeated what Hitler had said and had passed on these orders in his words. I know that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army who then directed the military operations in Poland had, at the daily conferences, already complained about attacks by police in occupied Polish territory. I can only say that I apparently repeated what had been said about these things in my presence by Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details. I might add that, to my recollection, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time often stated that as long as he had the executive power in the occupied territories he would under no circumstances tolerate any other authority in those territories; and at his own request he was relieved of his responsibility for Poland in October. I therefore believe that the statements the witness made from memory or on the strength of notes are not quite correct. Q. We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that in October, 1939, Germany had given an assurance of neutrality to Denmark and Norway?

A. Yes, I knew that.

Q. Were you and the O.K.W., or were you, personally, consulted about declarations of neutrality in this or other cases?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed of them?

A. No, we were not informed either. These were discussions referring to foreign policy of which we soldiers were not informed.

Q. You mean you were not informed officially. But you, as one who read newspapers, knew of them?

A. Yes.

Q. Good. Before our discussion about the problem of aggressive war I asked you a question which, in order to save time, I would rather not have to repeat. However, it seems to me that the question I put to you in order to get your opinion on aggressive war, must be asked again in this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country which had been given a guarantee, was bound to cause particular scruples on the part of people who have to do with this - the waging of war. Therefore, I put this question to you again, in this particular connection, and ask you to say what was your and the soldiers' reaction to it.

A. In this connection, I must say we were already at war. There was a state of war between England and France and Germany. It would not be right for me to say that I interfered in the least with these matters, but I regarded them rather as political matters and, as a soldier, I held the opinion that preparations for a military action against Norway and Denmark did not yet mean the real thing, that these preparations would very obviously take months if such an action was to materialise at all, and that, in the meantime, the situation might change. It was this train of thought which caused me not to take any steps in this matter. I considered it impossible to make strategic preparations at that time, and I therefore took no stand on the question of intervention in Norway and Denmark, and left these things to those who were concerned with political matters. I cannot put it any other way.

Q. When did the preparations for this action start?

A. I think the first discussion took place as early as October, 1939, but the first directives were issued only in January 1940, that is to say, several months later. In connection with the discussions before this Tribunal and with the information given by Reich Marshal Goering in his statements, I also remember that one day I was ordered to summon Grand Admiral Raeder to the Fuehrer, who wanted to discuss with him questions regarding sea warfare in the Bay of Heligoland and in the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers we would encounter in waging war in this area. Then Hitler ordered me to call together a special staff which was to study all these problems from the viewpoint of sea, air and land warfare - I remembered this also upon seeing the documents produced here. This special staff dispensed with my personal assistance. Hitler said at the time that he himself would furnish tasks for this staff. These were, I believe, the military considerations in the months from 1939 to the beginning of 1940.

Q. In this connection I should only like to know one further thing, and that is whether you had any conversation with Quisling at this stage of the preliminary measures?

A. No, I saw Quisling neither before nor after the Norway campaign; I saw him for the first time approximately one or two years later. There were no connections between us, not even any kind of transmission of information. I already stated in a preliminary interrogation that by order of Hitler I sent an officer, I believe it was Colonel Pieckenboeck, to Copenhagen for conferences with the Norwegians. I did not know Quisling.

Q. As to the war in the West, there is once more in the foreground the question of violation of neutrality, in the case of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. Did you know that these three countries bad been given assurances regarding the inviolability of their neutrality?

A. Yes, I knew and also was told that at that time.

Q. I do not want to ask the same questions as in the case of Norway and Denmark, but I should like to ask: Did you consider these assurances by Hitler to be honest?

A. When I remember the situation as it was then, I did at that time believe, when I learned of these things, that there was no intention of bringing any other State into the war. At any rate, I had no reason, no justification to assume the opposite, namely that this was intended as a deception.

Q. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you still believe that there was any possibility of terminating or localising the war?

A. Yes, I did believe this. My view was strengthened by the Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which allusions were made which convinced me that political discussions about this question were going on, above all, with England, and because Hitler had said to me time and again, whenever these questions were brought up, "The West is actually not interested in these Eastern problems of Germany." This was the phrase he always used to calm people, namely that the Western Powers were not interested in these problems. Furthermore, seen from a purely military point of view, it must be added that we soldiers had, of course, always expected an attack by the Western Powers, that is to say, France, during the Polish campaign and were very surprised that in the West, apart from some skirmishes between the Maginot Line and the Western Wall, nothing had actually happened, though we had - this I know for certain - along the whole Western front from the Dutch border to Basel only five divisions, apart from the small forces manning the fortifications of the Western Wall. Thus, from a purely military point of view, a French attack during the Polish campaign would have encountered only a military screen, not a real defence. Since nothing of this sort happened, we soldiers thought of course that the Western Powers had no serious intentions, because they did not take advantage of the extremely favourable situation for military operations, and did not undertake anything serious against us during the three to four weeks when all the German fighting formations were employed in the East. This also strengthened our views as to what the attitude of the Western Powers would probably be in the future.

Q. What were Hitler's plans for the West?

A. I do not quite understand the question.

Q. What were Hitler's plans for the West?

A. During the last phase of the Polish campaign, he had already transferred all unnecessary forces to the West, in case that at any time something might happen there. He had, however, at the same time, told me that he intended to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the West, and if possible attack in the West in the winter of 1939-40.

Q. Did these plans include attacks on and marching through Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland.

A. Not originally. At first, if I may speak as a soldier, the concentration of troops in the West was to be merely a security measure, that is, a thorough strengthening of the frontiers, particularly, of course, where there were only border posts. Accordingly, as early as at the end of September and the beginning of October, some troops were moved from the East to the West for security purposes only, without any particular concentration.

Q. What did the military leaders know about Belgium's and Holland's attitude?

A. Their views, naturally, changed several times, in the course of the winter. In the autumn of 1939 - I can only speak for myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter - I was convinced that Belgium wanted to keep out of the war under any circumstances, and would do anything she could to preserve her neutrality. On the other hand, we received, through close connections between the Belgium and Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded very threatening. I had no way of finding out whether they were true, but we learned of them and they indicated that Belgium was being submitted to strong pressure to give up her neutrality. As for Holland, all we knew at that time was that there were general staff relations between her and England. But then of course, in the months from October to May, 1940, the situation changed considerably, and the tension varied greatly. From the purely military point of view, we knew one thing: that all the French swift units, that is motorised units, were concentrated on the Belgian-French border, and we interpreted this measure as meaning that preparations were being made for crossing through Belgium at any time with these units and for taking a stand there on the borders of the Ruhr district. I think I should omit details here, because they are not important for the further developments, being of a purely operative and strategic nature.

Q. Were there differences of opinion between the generals and Hitler with reference to the attack in the West, which would have to take place through this neutral territory?

A. I must say that at that time one of the most serious crises in the whole war arose, because of the opinions held by a number of generals, including the Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, his Chief of General Staff, and myself. We wanted at all costs to attempt to prevent an attack in the West, but Hitler had already planned this for the winter. There were various reasons for our opinions: one was the difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West; another, which I am bound to mention, was that we believed at that time, perhaps more from the political point of view, that if we did not attack, the possibility of a peaceful solution might still be feasible. We considered that between then and the spring many political changes might well take place. Then again, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter war, in view of the short days and long nights, always a great hindrance to military operations. To Hitler's objection that the French motorised forces might march through Belgium at any time and then stand before the Ruhr district, we answered that we were equal to such a situation in a war of movement; we were a match for it; that was our view. I may say here that this situation led to a very serious crisis between Hitler and the Commander-in- Chief of the Army and also myself, because I held this view, one which Hitler vigorously rejected on the grounds that it was strategically wrong. In our talks he accused me in the sharpest manner, of conspiring against him with the generals of the Army and strengthening them in their opposition to his views. I must here state that I then asked to be relieved immediately of my post and given another, because I was greatly offended, and felt that under these circumstances the confidence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed. I may add that my relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army also suffered greatly in this matter, but the idea of my discharge and employment elsewhere was sharply rejected. It has already been discussed here; I need not go into it any further. But this break in confidence was never to be mended. In the case of Norway, there was a similar conflict of views. General Jodl's diary refers to it as a "serious crisis." I shall not go into this in detail, either.

Q. What was the motive of Hitler's speech to the Commanders- in-Chief on 23rd November, 1939, in the Reich Chancellery?

A. I can say that this was very closely connected with the crisis between Hitler and the generals which I have just discussed. He called a meeting of the generals on that occasion to present and substantiate his views, and we knew it was his intention to bring about a change in their attitude. In the notes on this speech, we see that individual persons were more than once directly and sharply rebuked. Those who had spoken against this attack in the West repeated their reasons for so doing. Moreover, he wanted to state his irrevocable intention to carry out this aggressive action in the West that very winter, because this - in his view - was the only strategic solution, as every moment's delay was to the enemy's advantage. In other words, at that time, he no longer counted on any other solution than resort to force of arms.

Q. When, then, was the decision made to advance through Belgium and Holland?

A. The preparations for such a march through and attack on Belgium and Holland had already been made, but Hitler delayed his decision actually to carry out such a big attack or to violate the neutrality of these countries, and remained undecided until the spring of 1940. This delay was, obviously, caused by all sorts of political reasons, and perhaps also because he thought that the problem might be solved automatically if the enemy invaded Belgium or if the mobile French troops crossed the frontier. I can only state that the decision for the carrying out of this plan was withheld until the very last moment and the order was given only just before it was to be executed. I believe that there was also one other factor in this, a factor which I have already mentioned, namely the relationship between the royal houses of Italy and Belgium. Hitler always surrounded his decisions with secrecy, for he was obviously afraid that they might become known through this relationship. (A recess was taken.)

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if, when you refer to Czechoslovakia or any other State you will refer to it by its proper name - you and the defendants and other witnesses.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the defendant Keitel wishes to make a slight correction in the statement which he made earlier in answer to my question regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

KEITEL: I said earlier that in the West during the war against Poland, there were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had mixed that up with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately twenty divisions, including the reserves in the Rhineland and in the West districts behind the lines. Therefore, the statement I made was made inadvertently and was a mistake.

Q. Now we come to the Balkans wars. The prosecution, with reference to the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, has accused you of having co-operated in the preparation, planning and above all in the carrying out of those wars. What is your attitude to this?

A. We were rushed into the war against Greece and against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 to our complete surprise and without having made any plans. This applies especially to Greece. I accompanied Hitler during his journey through France for the meetings with Marshal Petain and with Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we had our first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival in Florence, we received Mussolini's statement, which has already been mentioned by Reich Marshal Goering; namely, that the attack against Greece had already begun. I can say from my own personal knowledge that Hitler was extremely disgusted with this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the war, and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a break with Mussolini. I never knew of any intentions to wage war against Greece.

Q. Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war or how did that come about?

A. At first, the necessity did not exist, but during the early months - October-November - of that campaign, it soon became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely precarious. Therefore, as early as November or December, there were calls on the part of Mussolini for help, calls to assist him in some form or other. Apart from that, seen from the military point of view, it was clear, of course, that for the entire military position in the war, the defeat of Italy in the Balkans would have had considerable and very serious consequences. Therefore, assistance of some sort had to be improvised. I think a mountain division was to be brought in, but that was technically impossible, since there were no unloading facilities. Then another solution was attempted by means of air transport.

Q. At the time, however, when improvisations ceased, we come to the operation presented by the prosecution, and called "Marita." When was that operation conceived?

A. The war in Greece and Albania had begun to reach a state of stagnation because of winter conditions. During that time, plans were conceived to avoid a catastrophe for Italy, by bringing in against Greece certain forces from the North for an attack to relieve the pressure, for such I must call it. That would, of course, and did, take several months. May I just explain that at that time the idea of a march through Yugoslavia, or even the suggestion that forces should be brought in through that country was definitely turned down by Hitler, although the Army particularly had proposed that possibility as the most suitable way of bringing in troops. Regarding the operation "Marita," perhaps not much more can be said than to mention the march through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and discussed diplomatically with that country.

Q. I would like to ask just one more question on that subject. The prosecution has stated that even before the fall of the Yugoslav Government - that is to say, at the end of March, 1941 - negotiations were conducted with Hungary as to the possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia. Were you or the O.K.W. informed of this, or did you participate?

A. No. I have no recollection at all of any military discussion on the part of the O.K.W. with Hungary regarding military action in the case of Yugoslavia. That is completely unknown to me. On the contrary, everything that happened later on - I shall have to say a few words about Yugoslavia later - was merely improvised. Nothing had been prepared, at any rate, not with the knowledge of the O.K.W.

Q. But it is known to you, is it not, that military discussions with Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you merely want to say that they did not refer to Yugoslavia.

A. Of course, it was known to me that several discussions had taken place with the Hungarian General Staff.

Q. You said you wanted to say something else about the case of Yugoslavia. Reich Marshal Goering has here made statements upon that subject. Can you add anything new? Otherwise, I have no further questions with regard to that subject.

A. I should merely like to confirm once more that the decision to attack Yugoslavia meant completely upsetting all military movements and arrangements made up to that time. "Marita" had to be completely readjusted. Also new forces had to be brought through Hungary from the North. All that was completely improvised.

Q. We come now to the plan "Barbarossa." The Soviet Prosecution, particularly, have revealed that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940, had occupied themselves with a plan of attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for the first time talk to you about the possibility of a conflict, of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union?

A. As far as I recollect, that was at the beginning of August, 1940, on the occasion of a discussion of the situation at Berchtesgaden, or rather at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed.

Q. What reasons did Hitler give at that time for thinking that a war with the Soviet Union was possible?

A. I think I can refer to what Reich Marshal Goering has said on this subject. According to our conception, there were considerable troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Bukowina. The Foreign Minister, too, had mentioned figures, which I can't recall - and there was the anxiety which had been repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that something further might arise in the Roumanian theatre which would endanger our source of petroleum, the fuel supply for the conduct of the war, which for the most part came from that country. Apart from that, I think he talked about strong and obvious troop concentrations in the Baltic provinces.

Q. Were any directives given by you at that time or by those branches off the Armed Forces which were affected? A. No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against Russia and, secondly, to certain investigations regarding the possibility of transferring troops from the West, from France, as quickly as possible to the South-east areas or to East Prussia. Certain return transports of troops from the Eastern army corps districts had already taken place at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions were given at that time.

Q. How was the line of demarcation occupied?

A. There had been continual reports from that demarcation line, of frontier incidents, of firing, and particularly of frequent crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union. This led to the exchange of notes. There were small but fierce frontier actions, particularly in the South, and we received information through our frontier troops that from time to time new Russian troop units appeared opposite them, I think that was all.

Q. Do you know how many divisions of the German Wehrmacht were stationed there at the time?

A. During the Western campaign there were - I do not think I am wrong this time - seven divisions; seven divisions from East Prussia to the Carpathians, two of which, during the Western campaign, had even been transported to the West but were later on transported back again.

Q. The prosecution stated that at the end of July, 1940, Colonel General Jodl had given general instructions in a conference to certain officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to occupy themselves with the Russian problem, and particularly to examine railway transport conditions. Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you whether you were informed about these conferences of Colonel General Jodl.

A. No. I did not hear that such a conference took place in Berchtesgaden at the end of July or beginning of August until I came here. This was due to the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden. I did not know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to tell me about it at the time.

Q. What were your personal views at that time regarding the problem which arose out of the conference with Hitler?

A. When I realised that the matter had been given really serious thought I was most surprised, and I felt it most unfortunate. I seriously considered what could be done by using military arguments to influence Hitler. At that time, as has been briefly mentioned here by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a memorandum, giving my personal views on the matter, quite independently of the views of the experts on the General Staff and the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I intended to present this memorandum to Hitler, because, as a rule, one could never get beyond the second sentence of a discussion with him. He took the words out of one's mouth and after-wards one never was able to say what one wanted to. In this connection I should like to say that I had the idea - it was the first and only time - of visiting the Foreign Minister personally, in order to ask him to support me from the political angle regarding that question. Hence the visit to Fuschl, which has already been discussed here and which the Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day.

Q. Then you confirm what Herr von Ribbentrop has said, so that there is no need for me to repeat it?

A. I confirm that I went to Fuschl. I had the memorandum with me. It had been written by hand, since I did not want anybody else to see it, and I left Fuschl convinced that he wanted to try to exercise influence on Hitler to the same end. He promised me he would do so.

Q. Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?

A. Yes. Some time later at the Berghof, after a report of the situation had been given, I handed him that memorandum when we were alone. I think he told me at the time that he was going to study it. He took it without giving me a chance to make any explanations.

Q. Considering its importance did you later on find an opportunity to refer to it again?

A. Yes. At first nothing at all happened. Later, therefore, I reminded him of it and asked him to discuss the problem with me. This he did, and the matter was dealt with very briefly by his saying that the military and strategic considerations put forward by me were in no way convincing. He, Hitler, considered these ideas erroneous, and turned them down. In that connection I can perhaps mention very briefly that I was again very much upset and there was another crisis when I asked to be relieved of my post, and that another man be put in my office and that I be sent to the front. That once more led to a sharp controversy as has already been described by the Reich Marshal, when he said that Hitler took the attitude that he would not tolerate that a general, whose views he did not agree with, should ask to be relieved of his post because of his disagreement. I think he said that he had every right to turn down such suggestions and ideas if he considered them wrong, and that I had not the right to make any inferences from that.

Q. Did he return that memorandum to you?

A. No, I do not think I got it back. I have always assumed that it was found among the captured Schmundt files, but apparently such is not the case. I did not get it back; he kept it.

Q. I do not wish to occupy the time of the Tribunal in this connection any further. I will leave it to you as to whether you wish to disclose the contents of that memorandum. I am not so much concerned with the military presentation, one can imagine what that was, but the question is: did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that memorandum?

A. Yes, but I must say that the main part was devoted to military considerations; the balance of forces, the requirements of the forces, and the extent to which they were dispersed - with troops in France and Norway, and the air force in Italy, so that we were tied down in the West. In that memorandum I most certainly referred to the fact that that Non-Aggression Pact existed. But the memorandum was mainly concerned with military considerations.

Q. Were any military orders given at that time?

A. No orders were given at that time except for the improvement of lines of communications from the West to the East for speeding up troop transports, particularly to the South-eastern sector; in other words, north of the Carpathians and in the East Prussian sector. Apart from that no orders of any kind were given.

Q. Had the discussion with Foreign Minister Molotov already taken place?

A. No. On the contrary, the idea of a discussion with the Russians was still pending in October. Hitler also told me at the time, and he always emphasised this, that until such a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had been proved to him by General Jodl that in any case it was technically impossible to transfer strong troop units into the threatened sectors, which I have mentioned, in the East. Accordingly, nothing was done. The visit or discussion with the Russian delegation was arranged, in which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that time that Hitler should talk personally with Stalin. That was the only thing I did in the matter.

Q. During that conference were military matters discussed?

A. I didn't take any part in the discussions with M. Molotov, although in this instance also I was present at the reception and certain official functions, and on two occasions sat next to him at the table. I didn't hear any political discussion nor did I have any with, M. Molotov.

Q. What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an end?

A. He really said very little. He more or less said that he was disappointed in the discussions. I think he mentioned briefly that problems regarding the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea areas had been discussed in a general way and that he had not been able to get any positive reaction. He didn't go into details. I asked him about military matters which had a certain significance at the time - the strong forces, for instance, in the Bessarabian sector. I think Hitler evaded the question and said that was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone into it too deeply, or something similar. I can't remember exactly. At any rate, there was nothing new in it for us and nothing final.

Q. After that conference were any military orders given?

A. I think not even then, but Hitler told us at the time that he wished to wait for the reaction to these discussions in the Eastern area after the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been given to the ambassador, too, in that respect. However, orders were not given directly after the Molotov visit.

Q. May I ask you to state the date when the first definite instructions were given?

A. I can only reconstruct it on the strength of the "Barbarossa" instructions, which have been shown to me here and which came out in December. I believe it must have been during the first half of December that the well-known "Barbarossa" orders were given. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of December, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan.

Q. Did you know about the conferences which took place at Zossen in December and which have been mentioned by the prosecution here? Perhaps I may remind you that the Finnish General Heinrichs was present.

A. No, I knew nothing about the conference in Zossen. I think General Buschenhagen was also there, according to the statements he has made here. I did not know anything about the Finnish General Heinrichs' presence in Zossen and have heard about it for the first time here. The only way I can explain this is that the General Staff of the Army wanted to get documents or other things and that they discussed that in addition with the persons concerned. I did not meet General Heinrichs until May, 1941. At that time I had a talk with him and General Jodl at Salzburg. Before that I had never seen him and I had never talked to him.

Q. Is there any significance in the fact that Directive No. 21 says that Hitler would order the attack and the actual troop dispositions eight weeks before the operational plan would become effective?

A. Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I have been interrogated about that by the Soviet Union Delegation here. The reason was that according to the Army's calculations, it would take about eight weeks to get these troops, which were to be transported by rail, into position; that is to say, if troops from Reich territory were to be placed in position on an operative starting line. Hitler emphasised, when the repeated revisions of the plan were made, that he wanted to have complete control of those dispositions. In other words, troop movements without his approval were not to be made. That was the purpose of this directive.

Q. When did it become clear to you that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union?

A. As far as I can recollect, it was at the beginning of March. The idea was that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of May. Therefore the decision regarding the transport of troops by rail had to be made in the, middle of March. For that reason, during the first half of March a meeting of generals was called - that is to say, a command reception of generals at Hitler's headquarters, and the explanations given by him at that time had the clear purpose of telling the generals that he had on his own initiative decided to carry out those troop movements, although an order had not yet been given. He produced several suggestions, and issued certain instructions on matters which are contained in these directives here for the Special Case Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS, and these are the directives which were eventually signed by me too. He then gave us the directive for these guiding principles and ideas, so that the generals were already informed about the contents, which in turn induced me to confirm it in writing in this form; for there was nothing new in it for any one who had taken part in the discussions.

Q. It appears to me, however, that what Hitler told the generals in his address was something new; and it also seems to me that you who were concerned with these matters, that is to say, who had worked on them, understood or should have understood that now a completely abnormal method of warfare was about to begin, at least when seen from your traditional point of view as a soldier.

A. That is correct. Here views were expressed regarding the administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be conquered or occupied. There was the completely new idea of setting up Reich Commissioners and civil administrations. There was the definite decision to give Supreme Command to the Trustee of the Four-Year Plan in the economic field; and what was for me the most important point and the one that affected me most was the fact that apart from the authority of the commander of the occupation forces, as such, to administer those territories, it was clear that Reich Leader S.S. Himmler was to be given extensive plenipotentiary powers concerning all police actions which would, later, become necessary. I firmly opposed that, since to me it seemed impossible that there should be two forces working side by side. In the directives here it says: "The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is not affected by this." That was a complete illusion and self-deception. Quite the opposite happened. As long as it was possible, I fought against it. I think I ought to say that I have no witness to that other than General Jodl, who shared these experiences with me. Eventually, however, Hitler worked out these directives himself, more or less, and gave them the meaning he wanted. That I had no power to order the things which are contained in these directives is clear from the fact that it says that the Reich Marshal receives this task, and the Reich Leader S.S. receives that task, and so on. I had no say in these matters.

Q. Was it never actually discussed that if one wanted to launch an attack on the Soviet Union, one would have to take diplomatic steps or else send a declaration of war, or an ultimatum?

A. Oh yes, I discussed that. As early as the winter of 1940- 1, whenever there were discussions regarding the strength of the Russian forces on the demarcation line - that is in December-January - I asked Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to bring about a cleaning up, so to speak, of the situation. I can add now that the first time he said nothing at all, and the second time he refused, maintaining that it was useless, for he would only receive the answer that this was an internal affair and that it was none of our business, or something like that. At any rate, he refused. I tried again, at a later stage, that is to say, I voiced the request that an ultimatum should be presented before we entered upon an action, so that in some form the basis would be created to justify a preventive war, as we called it, if attacked.

Q. You say "preventive war." When the final decisions were made, what was the military situation?

A. I am best reminded of how we, or rather the Army judged the situation, by a summary or memorandum - I believe it is Document 872-PS - yes, 872-PS ... dated the end of January or the beginning of February - of a report made by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler regarding the state of operative and strategic preparations. In this document I found full details as to what we then knew of the strength of the Red Army, and other existing information. Apart from that, I have to add that the intelligence service of the O.K.W. - Admiral Canaris - placed at my disposal or at the Army's disposal very little material, because the Russian sector was closely sealed against German intelligence. In other words, there were gaps up to a certain point. Only the things contained in Document 872-PS were known.

Q. Would you like to say briefly what it contained, so as to justify your decision?

A. Yes, there were - Halder reported that there were approximately 150 Soviet divisions deployed along the line of demarcation and the borders. Then there were aerial photographs of a large number of aerodromes. In other words, there was a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia, which could at any time lead to military action. Only the actual fighting later made it clear just how far the enemy, had been prepared. I must say that we only fully realised all these things during the actual attack.

Q. You were present during Hitler's last speech to the Commanders in the East, made on 14th June, 1941, in the Reich Chancellery, were you not? I ask you to state briefly, without going over the same ground, what Hitler said on that occasion, and what effect it had on the generals.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn't there a document in connection with this? It must all be in the document. Isn't that so?

DR. NELTE: I wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the document at all, but will merely quote the short summary which is at the end of it. Will the Tribunal agree to that?

THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the document.

DR. NELTE: The document contains, if I may briefly indicate it, the following:

The development, and the continuously increasing influence of non-military organisations on the conduct of the war. This document proves that the Armed Forces, during this war - which must be called a degenerate war - tried, as far as possible, to keep within the limits of International Law and that when the.

THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all.

DR. NELTE: My question was directed to Field Marshal Keitel, and I asked him to tell me about the speech on 14th June, 1941; what Hitler ordered the generals to do, and what was their reaction. With that, I intended to conclude the preparations for the Russian campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don't see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other generals.

DR. NELTE: He can only give his own opinion, of course, but he can say whether the others reacted in any way, and if there were arguments or expostulations? I merely wanted to know whether this happened or not.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened that day at the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why don't you ask him?

BY DR. NELTE: Q. Please say.

A. After short addresses regarding the operational orders to the various commanders, there followed a recapitulation, which I must describe as a political speech. The main theme was that this was the decisive battle between two ideologies, and that this fact made it impossible to use in this war methods as we soldiers knew them and which were considered to be the only correct ones under International Law. The war could not be carried on by these means. In this case completely different standards had to be applied. This was an entirely new kind of war, based on completely different arguments and principles. After certain details had been explained, various orders were given with regard, to the abolition of any legal system in territories which were not pacified, and to the suppression, by brutal means, of all resistance. Every local resistance movement was to be considered as the logical outcome of the deep rift between the two ideologies. These were decidedly entirely new and very impressive ideas, and they affected us deeply.

Q. Did you, or any other generals raise objections to or make any expostulations against these explanations, directives and orders?

A. I personally did not - I had already voiced my objections. As to the other generals, I do not know whether any of them spoke to the Fuehrer on these matters. They did not, in any case, do so after that conference.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide whether you will accept the affidavits of the defendant Keitel contained in my document book No. 2 under the numbers 3 and 5, as exhibits. Perhaps the prosecution will express an opinion on this. Up to now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian campaign. In so far as the defendant Keitel and the O.K.W. is concerned, I should like to shorten the examination by submitting these two affidavits. The affidavit - No. 3 - is, an account of the conditions concerning orders in the East. The extent of the territory and the numerous organisations led to an extremely complicated procedure for giving orders. To make it possible for you to ascertain whether it was the defendant Keitel or the O.K.W., or some department that was responsible, the conditions concerning the giving of orders in the East have been presented in detail. I believe it would save a great deal of time if you would accept this document as an exhibit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dodd and I have no objection to this procedure used by the defence and we believe that it might probably help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts.

THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarise these affidavits?

DR. NELTE: I intend merely to submit it to you after I have asked the defendant whether the contents of the affidavits have been written and signed by him.

THE PRESIDENT: And the prosecution, of course, have had these affidavits for some time?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes.

DR. NELTE: The same applies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to affidavit No. 5!

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and give us also the dates of them so that we can identify them. Can you give us the dates of the affidavits ?

DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter in the secretary's office during the luncheon interval?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated 8th March, isn't it, and the other 18th March, I believe? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and give them numbers. It is nearly 1 o'clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?

DR. NELTE: We come now to the individual cases which I hope, however, to conclude in the course of the afternoon. I fear I must discuss the prisoner-of-war circumstances and individual matters. I think I still need this afternoon for myself. I believe that if I bear in mind the interests of the defendant Keitel, I am limiting myself a good deal.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not?

DR. NELTE: I think - I don't know how the President feels about it - it would be suitable if we had a recess now so that in the meantime I can put the affidavits in order. I have not yet finished the discussion of this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. (The Tribunal adjourned until 14.00 hours.)

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning, the first document, No. 3 of the second document book, entitled "The Command Relationships in the East," will be given the number 10 of the Keitel Documents. THE PRESIDENT: That is dated 14th March, 1946?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The document that I have got is headed 23rd February, 1946, and, at the end, 14th March, 1946. Is that the one?

DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later sworn to. There is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.

THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all.

DR. NELTE: It is the document of 14th March.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. NELTE: The affidavit is dated 14th March.

THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?

DR. NELTE: I give it No. K-10. The second document, which is fifth in the document book, is dated 18th March, 1946, and has at the end the defendant's attestation as of 29th March. This document has received the number K-12. Permit me to read a few points on Pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it appears to me, is of very great importance for this Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?

DR. NELTE: Document No. 12.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: The question in this document -

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I do not think the interpreters have found the document yet, have they?

DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says: "In summing up." Those are the last three pages of this document. "In summing up it must be established that:

1. In addition to the Armed Forces as the 1egal protector of the Reich internally and externally (as in every State), a peculiar, completely independent power-factor - I interpolate, the S.S. organisation - arose and was legalised. Politically, biologically, and in both police and administration matters, this organisation actually drew the powers of the State to itself.

2. Even at the beginning of military complications and conflicts the S.S. came to be the actual forerunner and standard-bearer of a policy of conquest and power.

3. After military actions had begun the Reichs-leader S.S. devised methods which always appeared appropriate, were mostly concealed, or if not, were hardly apparent from the outside, and which enabled him in reality to build up his power under the guise of protecting the annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.

4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with the organisation of political unrest, that is, of the so-called freedom movements and 'incidents,' the road leads straight through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into Russian territory.

5. With the directives for the 'Barbarossa' plan for the administration and utilisation of the conquered Eastern territories, the Armed Forces were, against their intention and without knowledge of the conditions, drawn further and further into the subsequent developments and activities.

6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the extent of Himmler's full powers, and had no idea of the possible effect of these powers.

I assume without further discussion that the same holds true for the O.K.H., which according to the order of the Fuehrer had made the agreements with Himmler's officials and had given orders to the subordinate army commanders. 7. In reality, it was not the Commander-in-Chief of the Army who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to decree law and maintain law in the occupied territories, but it was Himmler and Heydrich who decided on their own authority the fate of the people and prisoners, including prisoners of war, in whose camps they represented the executive power.

8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German officers, which taught unquestioning obedience to superiors who bore, the responsibility, led to an attitude, regrettable in retrospect, which caused them to shrink from rebelling against these orders and these methods even when they recognised their illegality, and inwardly refuted them.

9. The Fuehrer abused his authority and his fundamental No. 1 Order in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This No. 1 Order read, more or less:

1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong to his own range of assignments.

2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfil the tasks assigned to him.

3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary for the performance of the duties assigned to him.

4. No one shall transmit orders which are to be kept secret to subordinate offices to any greater extent or any earlier than is unavoidable for the achievement of the purpose.

10. If what would be the consequence of granting Himmler authority in the East had been known beforehand, the leading generals would have been the first to raise an unequivocal protest. That is my conviction. As these atrocities developed one out of the other, step by step and without any foreknowledge of the consequences, destiny took its tragic course, with fateful results." Witness, defendant Keitel, did you, yourself, write this statement, that is, dictate it as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with its contents and have you sworn to it?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original.

BY DR. NELTE:

Q. We had stopped at Document C-50 which mentioned the abolition of military jurisdiction in the "Barbarossa" area. I do not know whether you still want to express your opinion on it or whether that is now superfluous after what has just been read.

A. I should only like to say to this, that these documents C- 50 and 884-PS are the record of the directives that were given in that general staff meeting on the 24th June. In line with military regulations and customs they have been given the form of orders in writing and then sent to the subordinate officers.

Q. I have a few more short questions regarding the war against America. The prosecution asserts that Japan was influenced by Germany to wage war against America and has, in the course of its presentation, accused you of participation and co-operation in this plan. Would you like to make some statement regarding this?

A. Document C-75 is a directive by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces which deals with co-operation with Japan. Of course, I participated in the drawing-up of this order and signed it.

The other Document, 1881-PS, regarding a conference between the Fuehrer and Matsuoka I know nothing of, nor did I know anything of it at the time. I can only say the following for us soldiers: During the whole of this period, until the Japanese entry into the war against America, there were two points of view that were the general directions or principles which Hitler emphasised to us: One was to prevent America from entering the war under any circumstances; i.e. to avoid any naval operations in waters where American naval forces were present. Secondly, the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia, and I recall that around November and the beginning of December, 1941, when the advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted, and I visited the front with Hitler, I was asked several times by the generals: "When is Japan going to enter the war?" The reason for that question was that Russian Far- Eastern divisions were being continuously thrown into the fight around Moscow. These were fresh troops coming from the Far East, to the number of about 18 to 20 divisions, though I could not give exact figures. I was present at Matsuoka's visit in Berlin and I met him socially too, but I did not have any conversation with him. All the combinations that can be associated with Directive 24, C-75, and which I have gathered from the preliminary examination during my interrogation, are without any foundation for us soldiers and there is no justification for anyone's believing that we were guided by thoughts of bringing about a war between Japan and America, or of undertaking anything to that end. In conclusion I can only say that this directive was necessary because the branches of the Armed Forces offered resistance to giving Japan information about certain things (military secrets) in armament production unless she were in the war.

Q. There was also a letter submitted by the prosecution, a letter from Major von Falkenstein to the Air Staff. Reich Marshal Goering testified to this in his interrogation. I only wanted to ask you if you know of this letter or if you have anything to add to Reich Marshal Goering's testimony?

A. I have nothing to add, for I never saw this letter from von Falkenstein, until I saw it here for the first time on being interrogated.

Q. We come now to the individual facts with which you and the O.K.W are charged by the prosecution. Because of their great number I can naturally only choose individual groups and those with the most onerous charges, in order to elucidate whether and to what extent you were involved and what your attitude was to the ensuing results. In most cases it is a question of orders of Hitler, but in your statement on the actual happenings you have admitted to a certain participation and knowledge of these things. Therefore we must discuss these points. One of the most important of these questions is the question of hostages. I want to show you Document C-128 with regard to this question. These are orders for operations in the West. Let me ask you though, first of all, what is the reason for the taking of hostages as it was usually carried out by the Wehrmacht?

A. These are the Printed Regulations, "Secret G-2 H.Dv. G-2" and headed, according to the order: "Instructions for Army Units."

DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn to Document Book 1, K on Page 65 of my document book.

BY DR. NELTE: Q. I ask you to establish whether this is a copy from the aforementioned Army Regulations, Section 9, which deals with the question of hostages. This is Document K-7 and it reads as follows: "Hostages may be taken only by order of a Regimental Commander, an independent Battalion Commander or a Commander of equal rank. With regard to accommodation and feeding, it is to be noted that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are not convicts. Furthermore, only senior officers holding the position of at least a Divisional Commander can decide on the fate of hostages." That is, if you want to call it so, the Hostage Law of the German Wehrmacht.

A. I might say in this connection that in Document C-128, which is the preparatory operational order of the Army for the battle in the West, it is mentioned specially under the heading: "3A, Security measures against the population of occupied territory. (A) Hostages." THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as K-7? DR. NELTE: I ask to have these printed Army Instructions put in evidence as K-7.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say what you are putting it in as each time, because if you simply say "seven" it will lead to confusion.

DR. NELTE: K-7

BY DR. NELTE: Q. Was Document C-128 the orders of the High Command of the Army on the occasion of the march into France?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I have here another document, 1585-PS, which contains one point of view taken by the O.K.W. It is a letter to the Reich Minister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe; and in this letter, I assume, are contained the convictions held by the office of which you were head.

A. Yes.

Q. What do you say today in connection with this letter?

A. I can only say that it is precisely the same standpoint that I represent today, because, with reference to the above- mentioned order, appears the following paragraph, beginning with the words: "Security against any misuse." and so on. Then the order is quoted.

Q. This is in reference to the order GB-2 and further, regarding the decision as to the fate of hostages -

A. It says: "According to which the decision on the fate of hostages can only be made by someone of at least as high a rank as a divisional commander."

Q. Is it correct when I say that this letter was drawn up by the Legal Department of the O.K.W. after examination of the situation as regards International Law and its implications.

A. Yes, it is to be seen from the document itself that this point of view was taken into consideration.

Q. Did you issue any general orders on this question of hostages in your capacity as Chief of the O.K.W., apart from those we have had up to now?

A. No, the O.K.W. participated only in helping to draw up this order. No other basic orders or directions were issued on this question.

Q. Did you nevertheless in individual cases have anything to do with them on this question of hostages? You and the O.K.W. are charged by the prosecution of having expressed yourselves in some way or of having taken some kind of attitude when inquiries were made by Stuelpnagel and Falkenhausen.

I show you Document 1594-PS.

A. This document is a communication from von Falkenhausen, the Military Commander of Belgium, and is directed to the O.K.H., General Staff, Quartermaster General, and further to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, and Supreme Commander in the West and for the attention of the Netherlands and Luftgau Belgium. I do not know this document nor could I know it, for it is directed to the Army. The assumption expressed by the French Prosecutor that I received a letter from Falkenhausen is not true. I do not know this letter and it was not sent to me. Official communication between the military commanders in France and Belgium took place only between the O.K.H. and the two military commanders subordinate to him. These commanders were not subordinate either to the O.K.W. or to me.

Q. The French Prosecution has submitted Document UK-25 and has asserted that this document was the basis for the hostage legislation in France; that there is, in other words, a basic connection between the order you signed on 16th September, 1941, and the treatment of hostages in France. I will show you these documents, 1587-PS and 1588-PS in addition to UK-25, and request you to comment on them.

A. I must first answer the question as to whether I had any discussion on individual matters with military commanders regarding the question of hostages. Did you not ask me that?

Q. With regard to Stuelpnagel and Falkenhausen?

A. Yes, with regard to Stuelpnagel and Falkenhausen. It is possible, and I do recall one such case: Stuelpnagel called me up from Paris because he had received an order from the Army to shoot a certain number of hostages for an attack on members of the German Armed Forces. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That was done and I believe it is confirmed by a telegram, which has been shown to me here. It is also confirmed that at that time I had a meeting with Stuelpnagel in Berlin. Moreover, these two commanders got into touch with me only in exceptional circumstances. When they thought that I might assist them to carry out some difficult task which they did not feel able to deal with unaided; for example, in such questions as labour recruitment - that is, workers from Belgium or France destined for Germany - or even, in one case, conflicts between the military commanders and the police. In these cases I was called up directly in order to mediate. Permit me, please, to look at the documents now.

Q. You must begin with UK-25, 16th September, 1941.

A. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these documents in their heads by reference to their numbers and we haven't the documents before us. We do not know what documents you are dealing with here. It is quite impossible for us.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, I took the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal before the beginning of the sessions a list of documents. I am sorry if that was not done. I could not submit the documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this list.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is 1587-PS, which is not the one that you are referring to, apparently, and it is described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is 1594-PS, a letter to O.K.H. That again does not give us much indication of what it is about, except that it has something to do with the hostage question.

DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the defendant Keitel is about to answer. Have you not also the Order bearing No. C-128?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is "Directions for the Operation in the West."

DR. NELTE: And UK-25? THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And 1588-PS?

THE PRESIDENT: We have got them all. The only thing that I was pointing out to you was that the description of them is inadequate to explain to us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can indicate to us, when you come to the document, what it is about.

DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, regarding which the defendant Keitel is about to testify, is an order signed by him of 16th September, 1941, regarding "Communist Uprisings in the Occupied Territories." It contains, among other things, the sentence: "The Fuehrer has now ordered that most severe measures should be taken everywhere in order to crush this movement as soon as possible." The French Prosecution asserted that on the basis of this order, Hostage Legislation was promulgated in France. This is contained in Document 1588-PS. If you have this document, you will find on the third page regulations regarding the taking and treatment of hostages.

BY DR. NELTE: Q. The defendant is to state whether such a connection did exist and to what extent the O.K.W. and he himself were competent in these matters at all.

A. Document UK-25, the Fuehrer Order of 16th September, 1941, is, as you have just heard, concerned with Communist uprisings in occupied territories, and the fact that this is a Fuehrer order has already been mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its contents are concerned, was directed solely to the Eastern regions, particularly the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by the fact that there is attached to this document a distribution list, i.e. a list of the regions to which it pertains, beginning: "Wehrmacht Commanders, Southeast, for Serbia, Southern Greece and Crete." This was, of course, transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the O.K.H. with the possibility of passing it on to its subordinate officers. I believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I shall not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part of the French Prosecution that the basis for the hostage law is to be found in Document 1588-PS is false, and that there is no basic connection between the two. Also, the date of this hostage law is September, the number is hard to read, but, as can be seen from its contents, these two matters are, in my opinion, not connected. Moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium never received this order from the O.K.W. but they may have received it through the O.K.H., a matter which I cannot check on because I do not know. Regarding this order of 16th September, 1941, I should like to say that its considerable strictness can be traced back to the personal influence of the Fuehrer, and the fact that it is concerned with the Eastern region, which is to be seen already in the introduction, and does not need to be substantiated any further. It is correct to say that this order of 16th September, 1941, is signed by me.

Q. We come now to the second individual fact: "Nacht und Nebel." The prosecution charges you with having participated in the "Nacht und Nebel" decree of 12th December, 1941, Document L-90 -

A. May I say one more thing regarding the other question?

Q. Please, if it appears to be necessary. In the order of 2nd February, 1942, we find the words: "A decree of the Fuehrer of 7th December, 1941." You wanted to say something more; if it is important, please, have you Document L-90?

A. L-90, yes.

Q. What was the cause for this order, so terrible in its consequences?

A. I must state that it is perfectly clear to me that the connection of my name with this so-called "Nacht und Nebel" order is a serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the order that it is a Fuehrer order. Consequently I should like to state how this order came about. From the beginning of the Eastern campaign and in the late autumn of 1941 until the spring of 1942, the resistance movement, sabotage and everything connected with it, increased to a very great extent in all the occupied territories. From the military angle it meant that the security troops were tied down, having to be kept on the spot by the unrest. That is how I saw it from the military point of view. And day by day, through the daily reports we could picture the sequences of events in the individual occupation sectors. It was impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if such matters were concealed from him in the reports by military authorities. He got to know about them all the same. In this connection he said to me that it was very displeasing to him and very unfavourable to pacification; that, owing to this, death sentences by court-martial against saboteurs and their accomplices were increasing; that he did not wish this to occur, as from his point of view it merely made pacification and relations with the population more difficult. He said that pacification could only be achieved if sabotage decreased; that, instead of death sentences - if, as stated in the decree, a death sentence could not be expected and carried out - and instead of lengthy court- martial proceedings with numerous witnesses, the suspect or guilty persons concerned (if one may use the word "guilty") should be deported to Germany without their families knowing, and be interned or imprisoned. I expressed the greatest misgivings in this matter and know very well that I said at that time that I feared exactly the opposite results to those apparently hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there an ordinary legal procedure was excluded. I tried again to prevent this order being issued, or to have it modified. My efforts were in vain. The threat was made to me that the Minister of Justice would be commissioned to issue a corresponding decree, should the Wehrmacht not be able to do so. May I refer to details only in so far as this order L-90 contains the possibilities of preventing arbitrary application, and these were as follows: The general principles of the order provided that such deportation or abduction into Reich territory should take place only after a regular court-martial proceeding, and that in every case the judge, that is, the divisional commander, together with his legal adviser, must deal with the matter in the legal way, after preliminary. proceedings. I must say that I believed then that every arbitrary and excessive application of these principles was avoided by this provision. You will perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, "It is the will of the Fuehrer, after long consideration...," were not written in vain and not without the hope that the military commanders concerned would also recognise from this that this was a method of which we did not approve and which I did not consider to be right. Finally we introduced a verification procedure into the order so that through the higher channels of appeal, i.e. the Military C.-in-C. in France and the Supreme Command or Commander of the Army, it would be possible to try the case legally by court-martial if the verdict seemed open to question within the meaning of the decree. I learned here for the first time the full extent of the tragedy, viz.: that this order, which was only intended for the Wehrmacht and for the sole purpose of determining whether a criminal who faced a sentence in jail might be made to disappear by means of this "Nacht und Nebel" procedure, was obviously applied universally by the police, as testified by witnesses whom I have heard here, and according to the indictment which I also heard; and so the horrible fact of the existence of whole camps full of people deported through the "Nacht und Nebel" procedure has been proved. In my opinion, the Wehrmacht, at least, I and the military commanders of the occupied territories who participated, did not know of this in the drafting of this order. At any rate I was not informed of it. Therefore, this order, which in itself was undoubtedly very dangerous and disregarded certain requirements of law such as we understood it, was able to develop into that formidable affair of which the prosecution has spoken. The intention was to take those who were to be deported from their home country to Germany, because Hitler was of the opinion that penal servitude in war-time would not be considered by the persons concerned as dishonourable, in cases where it was a question of so-called patriots. It would be felt as a short detention which would end when the war was over. These reflections have already been made in part in the note. If you have any further questions, please put them.

Q. The order for the carrying out of this "Nacht und Nebel" policy, states that the Gestapo was to carry out the transportation of the condemned to Germany. You stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the Minister of Justice, that is, in normal custody. You will understand that by your reference to the Gestapo certain suspicions are raised that it was known from the start what happened to these people. Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter?

A. Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people should be turned over to the German legal authorities. This document signed "by order of ." and then the signature, was issued 8 weeks later than the decree itself by the Amt Auslands-Abwehr, as I can see from my official correspondence. It indicated the agreements, which had to be reached at that time, regarding the method by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to Germany. They were apparently conducted by this Amt Abwehr which evidently ordered police detachments as escorts. I might mention in this connection - as I must have witnessed it - that it did not seem objectionable at that time, because I had no reason to assume that these people were being turned over to the Gestapo - frankly speaking - to be liquidated, but that the Gestapo was simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation to Germany. I should like to emphasise that particularly, so that there can be no doubt that it was not our idea to do away with the people in the way that it was carried out later in that "Nacht und Nebel" camp.

Q. We come now to the question of parachutists, sabotage troops, and commando operations. The French Prosecution treats in detail the origin and effect of the two Fuehrer orders of 18th October, 1942, regarding the treatment of commandos.

DR. NELTE: (to the Tribunal) Has the Tribunal a copy of this Fuehrer order? It is 498 -

THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or 498?

DR. NELTE: The second is 553-PS

THE PRESIDENT: We have got that, "Combating of individual parachutists, Decree of 4.8.42."

DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? What you just said did not come through.

THE PRESIDENT: 553-PS, "Combating of individual parachutists, Decree of 4.8.42." That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498 -

Q. 553-PS is a notice signed by Keitel. The French Prosecution has assumed correctly that there is some connection between this document and the Fuehrer order of 18th October, 1942. The defendant is to testify what were the reasons that lay behind this Fuehrer order and this notice.

A. First of all, Document 553-PS, the notice: This notice was published by me in August, 1942. As in the description given by me in connection with the "Nacht und Nebel" decree, sabotage acts, the dropping of agents by parachute, the parachuting of arms, ammunition, explosives, radio sets and small groups of saboteurs reached greater and greater proportions. They were dropped at night from aircraft in thinly populated regions. This activity covered the whole area governed by Germany at that time. It extended from France over to Czechoslovakia and Poland, and from the East, as far as the Berlin area. Of course a large number of the people involved in these actions were captured and much of the material was taken. This memorandum was to rally all establishments outside the Wehrmacht, police and civilian authorities to the service against these methods, these new methods, which were, to our way of thinking, illegal, a sort of "war in the dark." Even today, after reading this document through again - it has already been given to me here - I consider this memorandum unobjectionable. It expressly provides that members of enemy forces, if captured by the police, should be taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after being identified. I know that in the French sector, the French police did their full share in arresting these troops and putting them in safe custody. They collaborated in preventing these acts of sabotage. It will perhaps make clear how extensive these activities were if I mention that on certain days there were as many as a hundred railroads blown up in this way. That is in the memorandum. Now, as to the Fuehrer's orders of 18th October, 1942, which have been mentioned very often here and which I may describe as the further development of the regulations mentioned in this memorandum. These illegal methods of fighting kept on increasing, and individual parachutists grew into small commando units who landed from heavy aircraft or by parachute, and were systematically employed not to create disturbances or destruction in general but to attack specific, vital and important military objectives. In Norway for instance, I recall that they had the task of blowing up the aluminium works. It may sound strange, but during this period, half to three-quarters of an hour of the daily discussion on the situation was devoted to the problem of how to handle these incidents. These incidents in all sectors caused the Fuehrer to demand other methods, vigorous measures, to combat this activity, which he characterised as "terrorism" and said that the only method that could be used to combat it was severe counter-measures. I recall that in reply to our objections as soldiers, the following words were spoken: "As long as the paratrooper or saboteur runs the danger only of being taken captive, he incurs no risk; in normal circumstances he risks nothing; we must take action against this." These were the reasons behind his thoughts. I was asked several times to express myself on this subject. General Jodl will also recall this. We did not know what we, as soldiers, were to do. We could make no suggestion. If I may sum up briefly, we heard Hitler's temperamental explosions on this subject almost every day, but we did nothing, not knowing what we could do. Hitler declared that this was against the Hague Convention and illegal, that it was a method of waging war not envisaged in the Hague Convention and which could not be foreseen. He said that this was a new war with which we had to contend and that new counter-measures would be needed. Then, to make it short, as I have already testified in the preliminary investigation, these orders - this order itself and the well-known instructions, that those who did not carry out the first order should be punished - were issued in a concise form and signed by Hitler. They were then distributed, I believe, by the Chief of the Operations Staff. I might add that many times the commanders who received these orders asked questions about how they were to be applied, particularly in connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not carry them out. The only reply we could make was: "You know what is in the orders," for we were not in a position to change these signed orders.

Q. The prosecution has accused you personally of having issued the order to kill the English saboteurs captured in the commando operations at Stavanger. In this connection I submit to you Documents 498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS.

DR. NELTE: This, Mr. President, was a commando mission in the neighbourhood of Stavanger. The troops who fell into German hands alive had to be killed, according to the Fuehrer decree. There was a remote possibility of interrogating these persons if that was demanded by military necessity. In this case the Commander-in-Chief in Norway, General von Falkenhorst, dealt with the matter. He turned to the O.K.W., as he has already testified in the minutes of an interrogation.

Q. Would you make any statement in this connection?

A. I was interrogated on this subject, and in the course of the interrogation, I was confronted with General von Falkenhorst. As far as I can remember he did not ask me questions regarding the carrying-out of this order. I did not know of it. Even the event itself was no longer in my memory, and I remembered it again only after I had seen the documents. During the interrogation, I told the interrogating judge that I had no authority to change that order; that I could only refer any one concerned to the order, as such. As regards General Falkenhorst, I should like to say only what is stated here in the minutes: "He obviously shelved the questions, and altered his earlier statements, but did not deny them." He said, "Keitel did not deny having had this talk with me but he denied that the subject of it was what I said."

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I can only say that this is a summary of the interrogation of Falkenhorst, a document which was submitted by the prosecution without having a document number.

Q. Have you finished your statement?

A. Yes. I believe that is all I want to say.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the prosecution did not put in this document, did it? It has not offered it in evidence.

DR. NELTE: I believe so, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I think they must have put it to the defendant Keitel in one of his interrogations, did they not? Isn't that right? That does not mean that it is put in evidence, because the interrogation itself, you see, need not be put in evidence. You must put it in now if you want it to go in.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is some error here. This document was put in by the prosecution here as proof of the assertion that the defendant Keitel had given the order to kill these paratroopers. I received the document here.

THE PRESIDENT: The prosecution will tell me if that is so, but I cannot think of any document having been put in here that has not had an exhibit number.

MR. DODD: We have no recollection of having put it in. Many of these interrogations did not have document numbers, but of course, if they were put in, they would have USA or GB exhibit numbers.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps the best way would be for counsel for the prosecution to verify whether it was read in evidence.

MR. DODD: That will take me a few minutes, your Honour.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean at your leisure. Would that be a convenient time to break off for ten minutes?

DR. NELTE: Yes. (A recess was taken.)

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at a quarter to five. It will then sit again in this Court in closed session, and it desires that both counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defence should be present then, as it wishes to discuss with counsel on both sides the best way of avoiding translating unnecessary documents. There have, as you know, been a very great number of documents put in and a great burden has fallen upon the Translating Division. That is the problem which the Tribunal wishes to discuss in closed session with counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defence. It will therefore, as I say, sit here in closed session where there is room for all the defence counsel. That is at five o'clock. (Continuation of the direct examination of the defendant Keitel.)

BY DR. NELTE:

Q. Do you remember an inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief, West, in June, 1944 regarding the treatment of sabotage troops behind the invasion front? A new situation was created by the invasion, and therefore by the problem of the commandos.

A. Yes, I remember, since these documents too have been submitted to me here and there were several documents concerned. It is true that the Commander-in-Chief, West, after the landing of Anglo-American forces in North France, considered that a new situation had arisen with reference to the Fuehrer Order of 18th October, 1942, directed against the parachute troops.

An inquiry was held and General Jodl and I represented the view of the Commander-in-Chief, West, namely that this order was not applicable here. Hitler refused to accept that point of view, and gave certain directives in reply, which, according to the documents, had at least two editions; after one had been cancelled as useless, the Document 551-PS remained as the final version as approved by the Fuehrer. The reason why I remember so accurately is because on the occasion of presenting that reply during the discussion of the situation, this written appendix was added by General Jodl with reference to the application of the order in the Italian theatre also. With that appendix this version, which was approved and demanded by Hitler, was then sent out to the Commander-in-Chief, West. Q. In this connection was the question discussed as to how the active support of such acts of sabotage by the population could be judged from the point of view of International Law?

A. Yes, that question arose repeatedly in connection with the order of 18th October, 1942, and the well-known leaflet previously discussed. I am of the opinion that, according to the Hague Regulations relating to Land Warfare any participation in such sabotage acts by agents or other adherents of the enemy is a violation of these regulations. If the population takes part in, aids or supports such action, or covers the perpetrators - hides them or helps them in any way - in any form, that, in my opinion, is clearly expressed in the Hague Regulations relating to Land Warfare, namely, that the population must not commit such actions.

Q. The French Prosecution has submitted a letter Of 3oth July, 1944, which is Document 537-PS. This document is concerned with the treatment of members of foreign military missions caught together with partisans. Do you know this order?

A. Yes, I do. Yes, I was interrogated on this Document 537- PS during the preliminary investigation and I made a statement, which I will repeat here: It had been reported that attached to the staffs of these partisans, particularly the leaders of the Serbian and Yugoslav partisans, there had been military missions which we were convinced were to maintain liaison with the States with which we were at war. This was reported to me and I had been asked what should be done in the event of such a mission being captured. When the Fuehrer was informed, he decided to reject the suggestions of the military authority concerned, namely, to treat them as prisoners of war, since according to the directive of 18th October, 1942, they were to be considered as saboteurs and treated as such. This document is, therefore, the transmission of this order which bears my signature.

Q. The problem of terror flyers and lynch-law has been mentioned during the examination of Reich Marshal Goering. I shall confine myself to a few questions which concern you personally in connection with that problem. You know what we are concerned with-terror flyers and their treatment? What was your attitude to this question?

A. The fact that, starting from a certain date in the summer of 1944, machine-gun attacks from aircraft were made against the population has already been mentioned here. These increased considerably, with thirty to forty victims on certain days. As a result Hitler categorically demanded an adequate ruling on this question. We soldiers were of the opinion that existing regulations were sufficient, and that new regulations were unnecessary. The question of lynch-law was dragged into the problem and the question of what was meant by the term "terror flyer." These two questions resulted in the very large quantity of documents which you all know and which contain the text of the discussion on these subjects.

Q. I think it will not be necessary to repeat the details which have already been discussed. In connection with your responsibility, I am interested in the words which you have written across one of these documents. Please, will you explain those?

A. I merely wanted to state, first of all, that I had suggested, following the lines of the warning issued when prisoners of war taken by the Germans at Dieppe were shackled, that a warning should be issued by our own side, too, in the form of a similar official note saying that we should make reprisals unless the enemy commanders stopped the practice of their own accord. That was turned down as not being a suitable course of action. And now let us turn to the documents, which are important to me.

Q. PS-735

A. There are some notes in handwriting made by Jodl and myself. That is the record of a report written by me in the margin which runs as follows: "Courts-martial won't work"; at least, that was the content. I wrote that at the time because the question of sentence by courts-martial came up for discussion, for the reason that this very document laid down in detail for the first time what a terror flyer was, and because it stated that terror attacks were always attacks carried out from low-flying aircraft. I was led to think that crews attacking in low-level flights could not, generally speaking, be captured alive if they crashed, for there is no possibility of saving oneself with a parachute from a low-level attack. Therefore, I wrote that remark in the margin. Furthermore, I considered, apart from the fact that one could not conduct proceedings against such a flyer, one would, secondly, not be able to conclude a satisfactory trial or a satisfactory investigation if an attack had been carried out from a considerable height, because no court, in my opinion, would be able to prove that such a man did have the intention of attacking those targets which possibly were hit. Finally, there was one last thought, which was that in accordance with the rules regarding court-martial proceedings against prisoners of war, the enemy State had to be informed through the protecting power, and three months' grace had to be given during which the home State could object to the sentence. It was, therefore, out of the question that, through those channels and in so short a time, the deterrent results desired could be achieved. That was really what I meant. I also wrote another note, and this refers to lynch-law: It states: "If you allow lynching at all, then you can hardly lay down rules for it." To that I cannot say very much, since my conviction is that there is no possibility of saying under what circumstances such a method could be regulated or justified, and I am still of the opinion that rules cannot be laid down for such proceedings.

Q. But what was your attitude regarding the question of lynch-law?

A. It was my point of view that it was a method completely impossible for us soldiers. One case had been reported by the Reich Marshal in which he had prohibited any proceedings against a soldier who had stopped such actions. I know of no case where soldiers, with reference to their duty as soldiers, behaved towards a prisoner of war in any other way than that laid down in the general regulations. I should also like to state - and this has not been mentioned yet - that I had a discussion with Reich Marshal Goering at the Berghof about the whole question, and he, at that time, quite clearly agreed with me: we soldiers must reject lynch-law under any circumstances. I requested him, in this awkward position in which we found ourselves, to approach Hitler once more, personally, and to try to persuade him not to compel us to give or draft an order of that kind. That was the situation.

Q. We now come to questions relating to prisoners of war.

A. May I just say finally that an order from the O.K.W. was never drafted and never issued.

Q. There is hardly any problem in the law of warfare in which all nations and all people are so passionately interested as the prisoner-of-war question. That is why, here too, the prosecution has stressed particularly those cases which were violations of laws for prisoners of war, according to the Geneva Convention, or to International Law in general. Since the O.K.W., and you as its Chief, were responsible for prisoner-of-war questions in Germany, I should like to put the following questions to you: What had been done in Germany to make all departments and offices of the Armed Forces acquainted with international agreements which referred to prisoners of war?

A. There was a special military manual on that subject, which I think is available, and which contained all the clauses in the existing international agreements and the provisions for carrying them out. That is, I think, Directive No. 38, which applied to the Army and the Navy, and also to the Air Force. That was the basis, the basic order.

Q. How was that put into practice? Was it the practice to inform those concerned with such questions or was it sufficient to draw their attention to the Army directives?

A. Every department, right down to the smallest unit, had these instructions and every, soldier, up to a point, was instructed on them. Apart from that, no further explanations and regulations were issued at the beginning of the war.

Q. I am thinking of the courses of instructions instituted in Vienna for that particular purpose. Do you know of them? Do you know that they took place in Vienna?

A. It is known to me that such matters were the subject of courses of instruction for those people who were actually in contact with prisoner-of-war matters ... they took the form of training courses. Q. Is it, furthermore, correct that every soldier had a leaflet in his pay book?

A Yes. That was confirmed by General Milch the other day, who had one with him.

Q. When were the first instructions regarding prisoners of war given in your case?

A . As far as I know, the first instructions appeared after the beginning of the Polish Campaign in the East, since every preparatory measure for reception of prisoners of war had been rejected by Hitler. He had prohibited it. Afterwards things had to be improvised at very short notice.

Q. What was ordered?

A. It was ordered that the three services, the Navy, Army and the Air Force - the latter only to a limited extent but particularly the Army - should make appropriate preparations for camps, guard and whatever was necessary for the establishment and the organisation of such services.

Q. Please tell us what were the functions of the O.K.W. regarding the treatment of prisoners of war?

A. The principal instruction was treatment according to rule KGW-38 based on international agreements; in my opinion it contained absolutely everything which the people concerned had to know. Apart from that, no additional instructions were issued at that time, but the above rule was applied.

Q. I should like to know first of all how far the O.K.W. had jurisdiction regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

A. The O.K.W. was, shall I say, the ministerial directing department which had to issue and prepare all basic regulations and directives concerning these questions. It was entitled to make sure, by means of inspections and surprise visits, that the instructions were carried out. In other words, it was the head office which issued directives and was entitled to make inspections, but was not in command of the camps themselves.

Q. Should one not add the contact with the Foreign Office?

A. Of course, I forgot that. One of the main tasks of the entire Armed Forces, and therefore of the Navy and Air Force too, was to communicate with the protecting powers, through the Foreign Office, and also to communicate with the International Red Cross and all agencies interested in the welfare of prisoners of war. I had forgotten that.

Q. Therefore the O.K.W. was, generally speaking, the legislator and the control organ. A. That is correct.

Q. What did the branches of the Armed Forces have to do?

A. The Navy and the Air Force had camps under their command, which were restricted to prisoners of war belonging to their own services; and so did the Army. But owing to the large numbers belonging to the Army, their camps were under the deputy commanding generals of the home front, that is the commanders of the Wehrkreis.

Q. Now, let us take the prisoner-of-war camps. Who was at the head of such a camp?

A. In the Wehrkreis command there was a commander for prisoners-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis concerned and the camp itself was under the charge of a camp commandant who had a small staff of officers, among them an intelligence officer and similar personnel who were necessary for such matters.

Q. Who was the superior officer of the commander for prisoner-of-war affairs in the Wehrkreis?

A. The commander of the Wehrkreis.

Q. Who was the superior of the Wehrkreis commander?

A. The Wehrkreis commanders were under the Commander-in- Chief of the Home Army and the Reserve, and he in turn under the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 5th April, 1946, at 10.00 hours.)

* Field Marshal Keitel's request to be executed by firing squad was rejected by the Allied Control Council for Germany. He was hanged at Nuremberg on 16th October, 1946.